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Abstract 
 
Against the backdrop of the Greek three-act tragedy, we present a theoretical framework for studying 
Greece’s recent debt and currency crisis. The model is built on two essential blocks: first, erratic 
macroeconomic policymaking in Greece is described using a stochastic regime-switching model; 
second, the euro area governments’ responses to uncertain macroeconomic policies in Greece are 
considered. The model’s mechanism and assumptions allow either for a Grexit from the euro area or, 
conversely, the avoidance of Greece’s default against its creditors. The model also offers useful 
guidance to understand key drivers of the long-winded negotiations between the Greek government 
and the “institutions”. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Greek debt crisis has received a great amount of attention from both academics and policymakers. 
Greece ran into difficulties and was placed under the financial market’s spotlight in 2010. In the 
summer of 2009, a new government took power in Greece. At the time, the country was believed to 
have a fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio of 4 per cent. However, after inspecting the expenditure and revenue 
data, the new government realized there had been a massive accounting fraud: the fiscal deficit-to-
GDP ratio was not 4 per cent but rather 15 per cent. Given this fiscal shock, which as been the result 
of policy errors made by successive governments over several decades, memories of the Argentinian 
crises 2001-2002 were invoked. The subsequent first EUR 110 billion bailout package in May 2010 
was born out of a constellation of fears. European Union leaders worried that a write-off of Greek debt 
would unleash Lehman-style international systemic spillovers and provoke an economic meltdown.1 
The austerity measures tipped Greece straight into recession. After five years, two bail-outs and a debt 
haircut in 2012, Greece’s economy is around 25 per cent smaller than at its peak in 2008, 
unemployment stands at 26 per cent and public debt is nearly 180 per cent of GDP. The existing 
governance structure provides little foundation for success and the old diseases of an inefficient tax 
system, red tape and corruption have not been eliminated. 2 One reason for this is that many promised 
reforms have either been neglected or implemented piecemeal and reluctantly.3 
After the election of the Syriza-led government in 2015 Greece again stood at the brink of debt 
default.  
A substantial amount of political brinkmanship was employed to achieve a negotiated outcome, which 
aimed to see the Greek government agree to a reform package with the so-called “institutions”, 
consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), in exchange for continued financial support. Given the dramatic deterioration 
in the economic situation, the Greek government finally applied for a new three-year programme from 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and a deal was finally struck after a marathon all-night 
summit that paved the way to a 3rd Greek bailout in August 2015, subject to strict conditions.4 The 
deal included loans of EUR 86 billion and a short-term economic stimulus plan for Greece. In return, 
the Greek government agreed to a number of structural reforms including pension cuts, VAT tax 
increases, the opening up of professions, the privatization of the electricity network and labour market 
reforms. A new privatization fund is to be set up, with the objective of eventually raising EUR 50 
                                                          
1 Blanchard (2014) has argued that macroeconomic policies should make avoiding dark corners a high priority.  
2 On the latest World Bank “Ease of Doing Business Index 2016” (http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-
reports/doing-business-2016) Greece ranks 60st, as the country with the very worst business environment in the 
EU, and far behind Iceland (12), Ireland (19), Portugal (23) and Spain (33). 
3 Rodrik (2014) has emphasized how difficult it may be to implement good governance and structural reforms in 
politically fragile countries. 
4 Refusal to strike a deal with the euro area would have terminated the ECB’s emergency lending to Greek 
banks, sending them into insolvency. Such a course would have led to the implosion of the Greek economy. 
2 
 
billion, of which half will go towards recapitalizing Greek banks, a quarter on paying down debt and 
the remaining quarter on investment. Privatization is expected to raise up to EUR 6.4 billion between 
2015 and 2017. The various structural reform programmes should lead to internal deflation and boost 
competitiveness.5  
Against this background of episodes of crisis and turbulence, the remainder of the paper is set out as 
follows. In Section 2 the theoretical background is laid out. The model aims to shed light on the 
economic and political upheavals in Greece and their consequences. In particular, we consider how 
erratic macroeconomic policies could undermine Greece’s euro area membership. Section 3 reports 
numerical model simulations which highlight the model’s mechanism. Finally, we offer some 
concluding remarks and offer pathways for future research in Section 4. 
 
2. A Simple Model of Grexit vs. Staying Afloat inside the Euro Area 
 
In this section we propose a new way of thinking about the Greek debt drama. In what follows, we 
make some conjectures about what strategies could be followed to do this. Emerging market and 
developing economies typically run current account deficits in order to smooth consumption 
intertemporally. The counterpart of these deficits is their dependence on capital inflows, which can 
suddenly stop. Indeed, since the early 1990s countries as diverse as Mexico, Russia, a group of East 
Asian countries, Brazil, Turkey and Argentina have all been hit by either currency or financial crises, 
or both. The boom-and-bust cycle left the countries in an overvalued position under a fixed exchange 
rate system. The “sudden stop” of capital inflows was almost always followed by a sharp contraction 
in gross domestic product.6 How best to incorporate the key features of the three-act Greek tragedy 
described above into an analytical model is far from obvious. The paper presents a theoretical 
framework for studying Greece’s recent debt crisis and how Grexit could occur. The novelty of the 
piece is that the Greek government’s adherence to a sustainable debt path is modelled as a stochastic 
regime-switching model. In this way, the Greece’s erratic behaviour is incorporated into the 
Eurozone’s decision of whether to grant continued aid or force Greece out of the Eurozone. The 
stylized theoretical framework is tractable in terms of understanding its mechanism but rich enough to 
capture the salient facts that lie at the heart of the Greek debt crisis. The broad goal is to tackle a very 
                                                          
5 The evolution of the ECB’s “Harmonized Competitiveness Index”, based on unit labour costs 
(https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/exchange/hci/html/hci_ulct_2014-10.en.html), shows that Greece had indeed 
experienced one of the greatest losses in unit labour cost competitiveness prior to the start of the crisis, but from 
2009Q4 to 2014Q4 unit labour cost competitiveness improved by 23 per cent. The considerable improvements in 
unit labour cost competitiveness were due to the massive drops in wages and salaries, which the “institutions” 
continued to insist upon with a view to improving the price competitiveness of Greek exports and import 
substitutes. 
6 Some observers have warned that Greece could turn into an Argentina, implying that the situation could get 
much worse (see, e.g., Reinhart, 2015). Others claimed that following Argentina into default and into a strong 
depreciation could help Greece to start a recovery (see, e.g., Krugman, 2015). Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) have 
documented that historically it has been quite common for sovereigns to default on their debts.   
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topical euro area issue.  One of our ancillary goals here is to try to operationalize the vague concept of 
erratic macroeconomic policies and reform willingness. We begin by constructing a sudden-stop type 
model in which the readiness for fiscal and structural reforms in Greece and the willingness of the 
“institutions” to provide foreign loans interact.7 Our starting point is the well-known equation for the 
dynamics of public debt:  
 (1)                                                                   𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 − 𝛵𝛵𝑠𝑠 + 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠, 
 
where 𝑑𝑑 denotes time, 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 is government expenditure, 𝛵𝛵𝑠𝑠 denotes tax revenues and 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 is the effective 
interest rate on Greece’s government debt.8 Thus, we exclude the possibility that the Greek 
government can borrow from the ECB to finance its deficit. The term (𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 − 𝛵𝛵𝑠𝑠), i.e. the difference 
between total expenditure and revenue, is the primary surplus/deficit. It is the primary surplus/deficit 
that is of central concern for economic policy.  
In order to pin down the determinants of the growth in the public debt-to-GDP ratio, we use the 
definition 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 = 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠, where 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 is the domestic price level and 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 is real national income. By rearranging 
the budget identity, we then have the following differential equation for the dynamics of the deficit-to-
GDP ratio: 
 (2)                                                           𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= −𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 + �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 
where 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 = −(𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 − Τ𝑠𝑠) 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠⁄  and thus positive (negative) 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 denotes a budget surplus (deficit), 𝜋𝜋 =(1 𝑃𝑃⁄ )(𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑⁄ ) is the constant inflation rate and 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 = (1 𝑦𝑦⁄ )(𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑⁄ ) is the constant growth rate of 
GDP. Equation (2) explains the four key determinants of the growth rate of the debt-to-GDP ratio: (1) 
the government budget surplus/deficit ratio; (2) the real interest rate on public debt; (3) the growth rate 
of GDP; (4) the existing ratio of government debt to GDP.  
Next, we move beyond the government’s budget identity. In colloquial terms, the phrase “sustainable 
sovereign debt” captures the notion of fiscal responsibility. To apply the term usefully in the currency 
crisis model context, it is important to be precise about what qualifies as sustainable fiscal policy. We 
define the decision rule as the public debt-to-GDP ratio 𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 = 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 (𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠)⁄  at the end of the support 
package period 𝑑𝑑 ∈ (𝑡𝑡, 𝜏𝜏), where 𝜏𝜏 denotes the end of the financial assistance arrangement. With 
                                                          
7 Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models are a conceivable modelling alternative. The common 
practice is to solve and estimate linearized DSGE models with Gaussian shocks. These models have tangible 
micro foundations and are now widely used for empirical research in macroeconomics. Because these models are 
built on real business cycle foundations, political economy issues play a distinctly second fiddle role, if they play 
any role at all. Therefore, it remains challenging for policymakers to use them in the formulation of policies. 
8 The sustainability of the Greek debt was an important issue in the negotiations on how to resolve the Greek 
crisis. Correspondingly, cutting the effective interest burden on the Greek sovereign debt was an important part 
of the various assistance programmes.  
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expected inflation rate 𝜋𝜋 and real income growth rate 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦, the value of 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 can be obtained via equation 
(2). Multiplying both sides of equation (3) by 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡), rearranging and integrating from 𝑑𝑑 =
𝑡𝑡 to 𝑑𝑑 = 𝜏𝜏 yields the following relationship between 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 and 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠: 
  (3)                                                        𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 = 𝑒𝑒�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)(𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣), 
 
where  
 
(4)                                                        𝑣𝑣 = − � 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏
𝑠𝑠=𝑡𝑡
. 
 
The value 𝑣𝑣 in equation (4) denotes the net present value of the reduction of public debt subject to the 
government budget surplus/deficit ratio 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡. The mind-focusing sustainability measure in equation (3) 
is simple and intuitive, yet rigorous, and distils a wealth of information into a single measure. By 
boiling the complexities of surveillance down into a single, comprehensible number, it gives the 
institutions something simple to aim at and also something against which they can measure the success 
of the Greek government’s endeavours. Hereinafter, we assume that the expected 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 serves as a basis 
for the decision making of the institutions. Clearly, 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 depends upon the government budget 
surplus/deficit ratio 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠. 
We turn our attention now to political uncertainty, which takes centre stage in the modelling 
framework. Political uncertainty is a vague concept and difficult to model. Historical experiences are 
an imperfect guide to the future and ought not to be seen as a clear precedent or template. However, as 
Greece’s pledges to the institutions were never fulfilled in the past, it is doubtful whether the Greek 
authorities will hit its budget targets in the future. This was the dilemma the European governments 
faced. What does this mean in detail? To focus the analysis on the uncertainty of the fiscal process, we 
assume that the Greek government budget surplus/deficit-to-GDP ratio 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 follows a Markov switching 
process.9 The Markov switching approach captures what the Greek government has long denied: that 
Greece must choose between the creditors’ path of sound fiscal policies or leaving the euro. This 
choice is central to our storyline and it is this ingredient that constitutes the key architecture of our 
                                                          
9 All uncertainty is associated with the fiscal policy process. For simplification and to sharpen the focus of the 
model, other stochastic shocks have been omitted. Furthermore, to keep the analysis transparent, the adequacy of 
the recommendations for action from the “institutions” are taken as given and are not scrutinized. For example, 
one might argue that austerity in a weak economy could be self-defeating as fiscal tightening curtails economic 
growth. One might also argue that Greece has a debt overhang. Finally, while structural reforms could possibly 
create a favourite environment for growth in the long term (IMF, 2015c, pp. 104–107), an immediate payoff is 
doubtful given the largely unchanged governance structure. These topics of discussion indicate that ongoing 
membership in the euro area does not necessarily mean a “Grecovery”. For a thorough examination of the 
channels through which structural reforms may promote growth and the optimal sequencing of reform, see 
Christiansen et al. (2013) and Eggertsson et al. (2014). 
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theoretical setup. For this, the deterministic growth of public debt in equations (2) - (4) is replaced by 
a nonlinear stochastic process. In other words, we propose a risk-based view of macroeconomic 
policies in Greece. In the sustainable Markov switching state (denoted by “0”), the Greek government 
generates a sufficient government budget surplus to remain solvent and thus negative 𝑣𝑣, leading to 
𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 < 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡. In the second Markov switching state (denoted by “1”), the Greek government chooses an 
unsustainable fiscal policy trajectory, leading to a further increase in public debt and thus positive 𝑣𝑣, 
with 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 > 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡. When fiscal policy is unsustainable, policies should change. This is simply the well-
known transversality condition ruling out Ponzi schemes. The Greek authorities could, for example, 
cut spending, increase tax revenues and implement non-budgetary policies that promote future growth. 
In a nutshell, we have: 
 (5)                                  𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 = �𝛿𝛿1 < 0: unsustainable fiscal policy regime𝛿𝛿0 > 0:      sustainable fiscal policy regime 
 
where for simplicity we assume that 𝛿𝛿0 and 𝛿𝛿1 are both constants. Although a reduced form, the 
Markov switching model is a flexible framework for modelling the political upheaval in Greece and its 
two-way interaction with the institutions. The two-state first-order Markov chain 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 ∈ {0,1} is 
characterized by the transition matrix 𝑃𝑃 ≡ �𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� ≡ Pr[𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 = 𝑗𝑗|𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠−∆𝑠𝑠 = 𝑖𝑖] for 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗 = 0,1 which 
can be written concisely as: 
 (6)                                              𝑃𝑃 = �1 − 𝑝𝑝01 𝑝𝑝01𝑝𝑝10 1 − 𝑝𝑝10� = �𝑝𝑝00 𝑝𝑝01𝑝𝑝10 𝑝𝑝11�, 
 
where 𝑝𝑝01 denotes the probability of jumping from state “0” to state “1” and 𝑝𝑝10 is the probability of 
jumping from state “1” to state “0”. We take an agnostic viewpoint and assume that the switching 
probabilities are exogenous. In other words, the probabilities are assumed to be independent from 
other events in the economy.10 Equation (6) governs the manner in which regime shifts occur. As the 
regime is a hidden state variable, the institutions face a signal extraction problem. In other words, the 
institutions incorporate the possibility of a political economy failure and the shift to a different fiscal 
regime when deciding on future assistance programmes.11  
                                                          
10 The volatility of the political system is clearly not an exogenous variable. Arguably, as regime transitions 
occur exogenously, they can be regarded as a measure of our ignorance rather than our understanding. Yet, the 
impact of political uncertainty is interesting, regardless of the actual causes. Our approach follows Zellner’s 
(1992) “KISS” (i.e. keep it sophisticatedly simple) principle. Ours is not the first paper to show that many 
economic variables can be modelled with the aid of Markov switching models. There is an extensive empirical 
literature modelling economies as following regime-switching processes. For background, see Hamilton (1989) 
and Kim and Nelson (1999) and the references contained therein. These findings motivate models that build 
regime-switching policy rules directly into theoretical frameworks. 
11 As shown in Appendix A, fiscal policy has been conducted in a stop-and-go fashion over the past decade and 
thus the Markov switching process is able to capture the recurrent fiscal balance regime changes in Greece. The 
6 
 
We are now in a position to consider the institutions’ decision rule properties. The response to the 
stochastic fiscal balance dynamics is a decision taken under uncertainty. As already noted, the regime 
is a hidden state variable, so the institutions face a signal extraction problem. A key aspect of the 
model is that foreign loan commitments are offered in return for (expected) credible fiscal and 
structural policies. Correspondingly, for the institutions, an awkward question arises in terms of how 
to calculate the likelihood that the Greek government will implement sustainable macroeconomic 
policies and play by the rules of engagement of the euro area. To formalize the notion of sustainable 
fiscal policy under regime switching, we assume that the institutions use 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 in equation (3) as a 
yardstick to measure the expected soundness of Greece’s fiscal policy. To compute the decision rule, 
𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏, we need the values of 𝑣𝑣 = −∫ 𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝑠𝑠−𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝜏𝜏𝑠𝑠=𝑡𝑡 , which may take two distinct values: 𝑣𝑣0 or 
𝑣𝑣1. The outcome 𝑣𝑣0 represents the case that the Greek government conducts a responsible and 
sustainable fiscal policy, while the outcome 𝑣𝑣1 represents the case that the Greek government reneges 
on its sound macroeconomic policy commitment. To obtain the analytical values of 𝑣𝑣0 and 𝑣𝑣1, we first 
need to obtain the corresponding Bellman equations for states “0” and “1” respectively: 
 (7)                                      �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�𝑣𝑣0 = −𝛿𝛿0 + 𝑝𝑝01(𝑣𝑣1 − 𝑣𝑣0) + 𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣0𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 , 
 (8)                                      �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�𝑣𝑣1 = −𝛿𝛿1 + 𝑝𝑝10(𝑣𝑣0 − 𝑣𝑣1) + 𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 . 
 
It is a straightforward matter to verify that the solution to (𝑣𝑣1 − 𝑣𝑣0) has a corresponding discount rate 
of �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10�. As shown in Appendix B, solving 𝑣𝑣0 and 𝑣𝑣1 yields, 
 (9)                  𝑣𝑣0 = �−𝛿𝛿0 𝜌𝜌 + 𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) 𝜌𝜌(𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)� �1 − 𝑒𝑒− 𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�  
−
𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) (𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)( 𝜌𝜌 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10) �1 − 𝑒𝑒−( 𝜌𝜌+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10)(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�, 
  
and 
 (10)      𝑣𝑣1 = �−𝛿𝛿1
𝜌𝜌
−
𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)
𝜌𝜌(𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)� �1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�+ 𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) (𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)(𝜌𝜌 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10) �1 − 𝑒𝑒−(𝜌𝜌+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10)(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
two regimes correspond roughly to periods in which most observers believe that fiscal policy actually differed. 
In any case, the data belie the fragility of the fiscal stance and provide useful clues in terms of where to look for 
potential model components.  
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where 𝜌𝜌 = 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦. Note that equations (9) and (10) satisfy the boundary conditions. Allowing 
𝜏𝜏 → 𝑡𝑡, the difference 𝑏𝑏𝑇𝑇𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡) − 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 approaches zero. Assuming a finite time horizon, we next 
replace (9) and (10) with their second-order Taylor series expansions. It can then easily be verified 
that we have: 
 (11)                       𝑣𝑣0 = −𝛿𝛿0 �(𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡) − 12  𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏 − 𝑡𝑡)2� + 12 𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)(𝜏𝜏 − 𝑡𝑡)2 
 
and 
 (12)                       𝑣𝑣1 = −𝛿𝛿1 �(𝑇𝑇 − 𝑡𝑡) − 12  𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏 − 𝑡𝑡)2� − 12 𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)(𝜏𝜏 − 𝑡𝑡)2 . 
 
From equations (11) and (12), we can see that the institutions incorporate the possibility of switching 
to different fiscal regimes when forming expectations. They observe the current fiscal regime and 
make a probabilistic inference regarding future fiscal regimes based on the Markov chain regime-
switching process governing the government budget surplus/deficit. An inferred regime change that is 
expected to be in place for a relatively long time generates a stronger response than one expected to 
revert after a short duration. In line with this intuition, sustainable fiscal policy is a positive function of 
𝑝𝑝10 and a negative function of 𝑝𝑝01. Given the analytical solutions for 𝑣𝑣0 and 𝑣𝑣1, we can then finally 
obtain the analytical solutions for the institutions’ decision rule. Substituting equations (9) and (10) 
into equation (3) yields:  
 (13)       𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏0 = 𝑒𝑒�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡) �𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + �−𝛿𝛿0 𝜌𝜌 + 𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) 𝜌𝜌(𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)� �1 − 𝑒𝑒− 𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�  
−
𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) (𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)( 𝜌𝜌 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10) �1 − 𝑒𝑒−( 𝜌𝜌+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10)(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�� 
 
and 
 (14)        𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏1 = 𝑒𝑒�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡) �𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 + �−𝛿𝛿1𝜌𝜌 − 𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)𝜌𝜌(𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)� �1 − 𝑒𝑒−𝜌𝜌(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�
+ 𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) (𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)(𝜌𝜌 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10) �1 − 𝑒𝑒−(𝜌𝜌+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10)(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)��. 
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Next, we characterize money demand.12 Suppose that money demand is given by 
 (15)                                                            𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼0 −  𝛼𝛼1ln𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠, 
 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡, 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 and 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 denote money demand, the price level and the nominal interest rate respectively; 𝑑𝑑 
denotes the financial assistance period 𝑑𝑑 ∈ (𝑡𝑡, 𝜏𝜏). All variables, except the interest rate, are in 
logarithmic form and the parameter 𝛼𝛼1 is positive. For simplicity, we exclude income from the money 
demand function. In turn and without loss of generality, the money supply is made up of domestic 
credit and intergovernmental financial support from euro area member states and the IMF to cope with 
the financial difficulties and economic challenges since May 2010: 
 (16)                                                                      𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠 = 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠, 
 
where 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 = ln𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 is domestic credit in logarithmic terms and 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑠𝑠 is the financial assistance 
provided to Greece under the 1st, 2nd and 3rd adjustment programmes in logarithmic terms. We assume 
that the money market clears. To focus the analysis on the effects of changes in the fiscal policy 
process, domestic credit takes the following form: 
 (17)                                                                𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠,   
 
where B is the public debt level and the parameters 𝛽𝛽0 and 𝛽𝛽1are positive. 
Furthermore, we assume that purchasing power parity holds. 
 
(18)                                                        𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠∗, 
 
where 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠, 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠∗ and 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 are the domestic price level, the foreign price level and the exchange rate, 
respectively. An asterisk always denotes foreign variables. Finally, uncovered interest rate parity 
implies: 
 
(19)                                                           𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 = 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠∗ + 𝑑𝑑 ln𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 , 
 
                                                          
12 The following assumptions stem from the currency crisis literature. The models in this literature start with the 
seminal continuous-time, perfect foresight model developed by Krugman (1979). Masson (2007, pp. 3 - 60) 
provides a thorough review of the currency crisis literature. Note that the paper isn’t really a currency crisis 
paper. Contrary to the first generation crisis approach no speculative attack occurs which forces a transition to a 
floating rate prior to the depletion of the reserves. What the current paper does have in common with first 
generation approaches is the use of a monetary model and the modeling of money growth in the post-crisis 
regime as a function of debt monetization. For recent contributions to the “sudden stop” literature, see Montiel 
(2013, 2014) and Sula (2010). 
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where ln𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠, and 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 and 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠∗ are the domestic and foreign interest rates respectively. Within the single 
currency area, 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 is normalised to 1. Once Greece leaves the euro area, the exchange rates is assumed 
to float freely.  
To gain further insights into the properties of the model, the next step is to determine the degree of 
depreciation of the relaunched drachma after a Grexit. Assuming that the Greek government is 
determined to carry things to the extreme, the institutions finally deliver the bitter truth to the Greek 
government. In other words, we consider the situation in which fiscal irresponsibility and lack of 
willingness to undertake reform turn bad, leading to a withdrawal from the euro area. This happens 
when room for manoeuvre has run out and the institutions deem 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏1 > 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 to be too high and 
unsustainable.  
The level of the drachma exchange rate depends critically on what kind of exchange rate regime is 
expected to prevail right after the Grexit. Without a foreign line of credit, it is probably reasonable to 
consider a free-floating drachma as representing the alternative to euro area membership. Furthermore, 
we assume that Greece remains vulnerable to political upheaval in such an explosive situation, putting 
the country on a knife edge. To this end, we assume that during a tranquil period, the macroeconomic 
environment is still characterized by the Markov switching framework presented above. This does not 
preclude a change in model parameters, analysed in the numerical model analysis below. Finally, we 
assume that Greece will leave the euro area permanently.13 These assumptions can clearly be stated to 
imply: 
 (20)                            𝑑𝑑𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= �−𝛿𝛿1 − 𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10� + �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠  
 
after the Grexit as 𝜏𝜏 approaches infinity. Note that, unlike in the model presented above, the lower 
interest rate 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 no longer applies. To derive the associated rate of change for nominal public debt, we 
first need to substitute −𝛿𝛿𝑠𝑠 = −𝛿𝛿1 − 𝑝𝑝10�𝛿𝛿0−𝛿𝛿1� 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10 into equation (1). Simplifying further then 
allows us to obtain: 
 (21)                               𝑑𝑑𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 �−𝛿𝛿1 − 𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10� + 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 
 
                                                          
13 In the course of the debate, a temporary Grexit has also been suggested. If the ECB allowed the Greek 
authorities to introduce an emergency parallel “currency”, Greece might in effect suspend its euro area 
membership without technically leaving. This could then be reversed if Greece struck a deal with its creditors at 
a later date. By continuing as part of the euro area, the Bank of Greece might retain credibility, which it would 
otherwise lack. The positive impact would be that the Greek economy might not slump as far as it would 
otherwise and the drachma might depreciate less than otherwise. Technically, this can also be modelled by the 
Markov switching approach. 
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We can now employ equations (17) and (1) to get the expected paths for credit growth: 
 (22)                    1
𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠
 𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 𝛽𝛽1
𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 �𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 �−𝛿𝛿1 − 𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10� + 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠�.  
 
As a by-product of the modelling exercise, we next back out the exchange rate of the relaunched 
drachma after a Grexit as a function of the other parameters of the model. The floating exchange rate 
implies that PPP holds. This gives us: 
 (23)                                                           𝑑𝑑 ln 𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
=  𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
= 1
𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠
 𝑑𝑑𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
  , 
 
where foreign prices are constant over time and domestic inflation is equal to domestic credit growth. 
Recall that the instantaneous rate of depreciation of the relaunched drachma after the Grexit is 
determined by 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 = 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠∗ + 𝑑𝑑 ln𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠 . As shown in Appendix C, the drachma exchange rate after the Grexit 
is given by:  
 
(24)          ln  𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼1 ln
⎝
⎛1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 �𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 �−𝛿𝛿1 − 𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10� + 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠� 
𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠
∗
⎠
⎞ 
 
Equation (24) is based upon the assumption of a constant money supply. Intuitively, equation (24) 
implies that a decrease in 𝑝𝑝10 – and thus more a long-lasting unsustainable trajectory of 
macroeconomic policies – will, ceteris paribus, lead to higher depreciation of the new drachma.  
In this section we have built a basic model – a road map of reality, if you will – to enhance our 
understanding of the three-act Greek tragedy. Armed with this framework, we now turn to numerical 
model simulations and robustness checks. 
  
3. Model Simulations and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Using the model as in a laboratory test, we now aim to provide a quantitative assessment of the 
modelling framework. Furthermore, controlled experiments can be conducted to investigate 
hypothetical questions. For example, how would the creditor’s decision rule differ for different 
regime-switching probabilities? Similar exercises are implemented to simulate the impacts of various 
other parameter changes. This uncovers the sensitivity of the benchmark results with respect to several 
key parameters. The obvious next question is what are the “correct” values of the parameters? As a 
general rule, we have chosen parameters consistent with the macroeconomic and finance literature. 
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Some of the parameters are based on the estimates of several authors. Other parameters are more 
subjective and readers may disagree with the numbers and consider them speculative. As this is the 
case, we have calculated the numerical solutions for ranges of parameter values and have thereby 
determined which parameters are particularly critical.  
The unit time length corresponds to one year. To assess the impacts of different probabilities regimes 
on the values of 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏0 and 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏1 accurately, we need to assign some benchmark values for equations (13) 
and (14). The interest rate 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 is assumed to be 2.0 per cent. This is broadly consistent with the actual 
figure. The GDP growth rate and the inflation rate are 1.0 per cent and zero per cent respectively. The 
current debt-to-real income level 𝑏𝑏𝑡𝑡 is equal to 1.8. A 1.0 per cent GDP growth rate is consistent with 
recent long-term forecasts (see McQuinn and Whelan, 2015). According to the IMF (2015a, 2015b, 
2015c), the revised GDP growth assessment for Greece is 1.5 per cent, although it describes this 
forecast as “ambitious”. The creditor’s time horizon (𝜏𝜏 − 𝑡𝑡) is assumed to be 15 years.14 Next, we 
need to focus attention on the fiscal balance and Markov switching benchmark values. In accordance 
with the demands of the institutions, the fiscal surplus in terms of GDP in state “0” is assumed to be 
𝛿𝛿0 = 0.035. The fiscal deficit in state “1” is assumed to be 𝛿𝛿1 = −0.020. The baseline benchmark 
probabilities 𝑝𝑝01 and 𝑝𝑝10 are both equal to 0.2. The expected macroeconomic policy regime duration 
implied by the baseline calibration is thus [1 (1 − 𝑝𝑝01)⁄ ] = [1 (1 − 𝑝𝑝10)⁄ ] = [1 (1 − 0.2)⁄ ] =1.25 years. Below, we provide results for several additional specifications around these central values, 
intended to probe the robustness of our calibrations and to verify the validity of our conclusions.  
Does the model mimic outcomes that broadly match those witnessed in Greece since the country ran 
into difficulties and was placed under the financial market’s spotlight in 2010?15 First, we consider 
alternative specifications of the transition matrix P. Logic implies that the numerical results are 
expected to be sensitive to the parameters of matrix P. Note that the standard fixed-regime model 
without macroeconomic policy uncertainty is nested within our framework. By deriving 𝑝𝑝01 → 0 or 
𝑝𝑝10 → 0, our regime-switching model with future policy uncertainty collapses into a fixed-regime 
model without future policy uncertainty. Put together Greece’s government paralysis and creditors’ 
fear of instability and what emerges?  
The three-dimensional graphs map the 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏-planes for both states (𝑖𝑖 = 0,1) and alternative calibrations 
of the transition matrix in the range 𝑝𝑝01 ∈ (0,0.4) and 𝑝𝑝10 ∈ (0,0.4) respectively. In addition, the 
various model simulations in the three rows of the graph trace the decision rule equation (3) for 
                                                          
14 The average maturity of the Greek sovereign debt is approximately 16 years (De Grauwe, 2015). This is 
considerably longer than the maturities of the government debt of the other euro area countries. 
15 The numerical results should be viewed as largely illustrative. Applying the modelling framework in practice 
yields an intuitive interpretation of the model without requiring a background in stochastic calculus to 
understand the arguments in the text. 
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different combinations of the government budget surplus/deficit across regimes. Remember that the 
expected 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 serves as the basis for the decision making of the institutions.16 
As can be seen, 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏1 always exceeds 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏0 for a given constellation of parameters. Furthermore, Figure 1 
clearly reveals that the regime-switching probabilities 𝑝𝑝01 and 𝑝𝑝10 are very important in explaining 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏0 
and 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏1. In other words, 𝑝𝑝01 and 𝑝𝑝10 have a prominent effect on the creditors’ decision rule. Moreover, 
the signs are intuitive: in response to higher 𝑝𝑝01 (𝑝𝑝10), 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 increases (decreases) and thus the Grexit is 
more (less) likely. A politically fragile situation characterized by high 𝑝𝑝01 in combination with small 
𝑝𝑝10 reduces confidence sharply and trust between the Greek government and the institutions may 
break down almost entirely. How are the numerical results to be interpreted in terms of the debate 
among the institutions? According to the IMF (2015a, 2015b), Greece’s debt-to-GDP ratio will peak in 
2016, but will still be 175 per cent in 2020 and 160 per cent in 2022. The IMF views a debt-to-GDP 
ratio above 120 per cent unsustainable. For plausible jump probabilities, the results thus confirm the 
IMF’s (2015a, 2015b) view that Greece’s debt remains unsustainable and will continue to be so unless 
watering down of the fiscal targets imposed by the institutions provides breathing space for Greece. 
Thus, Greece’s tightrope walk, which may bring the country to the edge, is likely to continue. 
Consequently, Greece’s European partners may have to provide significant debt relief in the future, 
well beyond what has been considered so far.17 The flipside of the argument is that staying afloat in 
the euro area without a further bailout requires the combination of a very small 𝑝𝑝01 in combination 
with a sufficiently large 𝑝𝑝10.18  
Overall, we interpret the results in Figure 1 as suggesting that macroeconomic policy uncertainty and 
political upheaval might be playing a sizeable role in the currency crisis and certainly a more 
important one than typically presumed in modern international economics. In other words, our 
modelling approach has the appealing virtue of conveying important and useful information about the 
three-act Greek tragedy while sidestepping the contentious issue of an appropriate political economy 
microfoundation. 
 
 
  
                                                          
16 We use the term “creditors’ decision rule” as it better captures the economic concept than the more technical 
counterpart 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏, i.e. our specific measure. This also has the virtue of easing exposition and avoiding ambiguity. 
17 In 2016, the institutions will resume their talks with Greece concerning another debt restructuring, with the 
main objective of ensuring that Greece does not face unstable dynamics. Note that default on sovereign debt is 
rarely full and absolute. Generally, payments are suspended and restructuring takes place. This process typically 
involves both a reduction in total commitments and a rescheduling of payments. Reinhart and Trebesch (2015) 
have shown that since its independence in 1829, Greece has defaulted four times on its external creditors. In 
other words, bailouts are a recurrent theme in Greek history. 
18 There is no cast iron rule for what debt ratio is too high, but there is no question that where Greece is heading 
with large (small) 𝑝𝑝01 (𝑝𝑝10) will not be sustainable in the medium to long term. 
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Figure 1: Creditors’ Decision Rule under Alternative Calibrations of the Transition Matrix 𝑷𝑷 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The value ranges are defined as follows. Dark blue: 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 > 1.8; light blue: 1.6 <  𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 < 1.8; yellow: 1.4 <  𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 < 1.6; red: 1.2 <  𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 < 1.4. 
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Next, we analyse the implications of alternative GDP growth rates 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦. Alongside structural reforms, 
the GDP growth rate may change. Higher (lower) tax revenues in the years ahead may stem from 
accelerated (delayed) structural reforms and good (bad) governance. To see how the GDP growth rates  𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 = 0.02 vs.  𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 = 0.03 affect the creditors’ decision rule, let us consider Figure 2. The higher GDP 
growth rates represent the optimistic case, in which the curtailing and streamlining of public 
expenditures, incorporating the informal economy into the formal one, increasing the size of the tax 
base and attacking the clientelist system in which rent-seeking groups are bought off with subsidies 
and tax breaks, leads to higher GDP growth than in the baseline scenario. 
 
Figure 2: The Impact of Alternative Growth Rates 𝜼𝜼𝒚𝒚 under Alternative Calibrations of the 
Transition Matrix 𝑷𝑷 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The value ranges are defined as follows. Dark blue: 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 > 1.8; light blue: 1.6 <  𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 < 1.8; yellow: 1.4 <  𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 < 1.6; red: 1.2 <  𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 < 1.4; dark blue: 1.2 <  𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏 < 1.0. 
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Again, the three-dimensional graphs make it possible to determine the impact of attenuated and 
elevated political uncertainty respectively. The main conclusions to be drawn are as follows. First, the 
eye-catching difference between panel A in Figure 1 and Figure 2 is consistent with the central 
message of this paper. Broadly speaking, more (less) policy uncertainty shifts the 𝑏𝑏𝜏𝜏-plane up (down). 
In other words, the costs associated with an erratic and dysfunctional political environment are again 
clearly visible. Second, higher GDP growth makes Greece’s public debt much more sustainable. 
However, an upshot of the numerical results is that generating higher growth is a tall order.19 In the 
positive scenario,  𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 = 0.03, the Greek economy will benefit from growth-enhancing reforms and 
dynamic global growth and will manage to hit its austerity targets. How realistic are higher GDP 
growth rates in the years ahead? The optimistic view is that vigorous supply-side reforms have a good 
chance of stabilizing the economy and achieving higher GDP growth rates. However, the contention 
that Greece would achieve faster growth after a Grexit runs into two counterarguments. First, a Grexit 
will involve a long, uncertain and economically costly transition process, transforming the Greek 
economy, reducing its GDP, increasing the volatility of GDP and weakening the financial system in 
the first instance. Second, given Greece’s fiscal mismanagement and anti-market and anti-enterprise 
policies in the past, it remains uncertain whether the Greek government really wishes to address the 
disease and whether it can restore confidence. These are not extreme or unrealistic scenarios. After 
watching successive Greek governments of all political stripes falling short on the reform agenda as 
the country has lurched from one crisis to the next, the pessimistic scenario seems entirely realistic. In 
fact, one can argue that the lack of readiness of the Greece authorities to embrace structural reforms is 
a drag on further growth. This is also a channel through which Grexit vulnerability becomes 
compounded over time. Ultimately, the institutions may abandon the defence of Greece’s euro area 
membership. 
So far, we have assessed the implications of changes in the perceived transition probabilities. Next, we 
analyse the implications of alternative interest rates 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 and thus interest rate concessions of different 
degrees. In the literature, conflicting findings and views on debt refinancing rates and the 
sustainability of Greek debt have been expressed. For instance, De Grauwe (2015), with an 
assumption of modest growth, finds public debt sustainable, whereas the IMF (2015a, 2015b) finds 
that the debt cannot be considered sustainable (for a comparison, see Consiglio and Zenios [2015]). 
Due to the generous interest subsidies contained in the rescue packages, the average interest rate in the 
Greek budget is currently only around 2 per cent. As large parts of Greek government debt will remain 
subject to favourable conditions for some time, thanks to the assistance programmes, this average 
interest rate is unlikely to change to any considerable degree over the next few years. As Greece 
                                                          
19 For a recent DSGE analysis of the costs and benefits of delaying austerity in Greece, see House and Tesar 
(2015). In this analysis, the authors assume the full credibility of the Greek government with regard to future 
reforms. In other words, policy uncertainty has been supressed in the analysis. Cacciatore et al. (2015) have 
recently explored the consequences of labour and product market reforms within monetary union in a DSGE 
setup. 
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gradually makes a comeback on the capital market, however, average interest rates look set to chart a 
moderate increase in the medium term. In 2025, for example, around one third of Greek government 
debt is likely to be linked again directly to the country’s credit rating. This, combined with a general 
increase in yields, will push the average interest rate in the Greek budget up to around 3.0–3.5 per cent 
in 2025. 
 
Figure 3: Creditors’ Decision Rule under Alternative 𝒓𝒓𝒃𝒃 and 𝜼𝜼𝒚𝒚 
 
The implications of alternative interest rates 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 can be understood from Figure 3. So, how to interpret 
the results? First, in line with intuition and the conventional view, we find that the interest rate is very 
important for Greece’s debt sustainability and interest rate concessions consistently free up fiscal 
space that can be used to service public debt. Second, the purple and green lines map the simulated 
impact of alternative interest rates 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 upon the institutions’ decision rule for a higher GDP growth rate 
of  𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 = 0.03. This represents the optimistic scenario, namely that structural reforms in Greece are 
implemented and achieve growth. The comparison of the various trajectories indicates that higher 
GDP growth rates are of the utmost importance in making the existing debt levels sustainable. Third, 
such brighter spots aside, all interest rate above 𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 ≈ 0.025 imply that Greece is not only illiquid but 
insolvent. In other words, interest rates 𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵 above 0.025 will raise warning flags and undermine euro 
area membership and may trigger a Grexit. Finally, compared to the literature, the simulated pathways 
are slightly more optimistic than the predictions of the IMF (2015a, 2015b, 2015c), but more 
pessimistic than those of De Grauwe (2015). 
Finally, we consider the implications of a Grexit for the relaunched drachma.20 In other words, the 
Greek government is assumed to continue blindly on the path of pursuing unsustainable policies so 
                                                          
20 After exit, Greece would have to negotiate continued EU participation. The EU treaties have a provision for 
leaving the union, but not just the eurozone. That negotiation would be all the more difficult were new 
authorities in Greece to default on debt to the European Financial Stability Facility, the ECB and the IMF. 
Furthermore, Greek firms would face legal and financial disaster. Some contracts governed by Greek law would 
be converted into a new drachma, while other foreign law contracts would remain in euros. Many contracts could 
end up in legal disputes over whether they should be converted or not. 
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that the creditors finally lose patience. Again, the numerical simulations are performed with regard to 
a benchmark case. Where possible, parameter values are drawn from empirical studies. We set the 
central benchmark parameters as follows. The interest rate elasticity of money demand in equation 
(15) is set at 𝛼𝛼1 = 0.3, as in Mohsen and Economidou (2005).21 The foreign interest rate is set to r* = 
0.03. For simplicity, we have normalized 𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 = 1 and 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 = 1. Some other parameters are inherently 
difficult to measure. For a start, the interest and inflation rates right after the Grexit are assumed to be 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 0.18 and 𝜋𝜋 = 0.16 respectively. Finally, we assume 𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 = 1.8, 𝛽𝛽0 = 1 and 𝛽𝛽1 = 0.6. Again we 
consider an uncertain policy environment. A key aspect of the Markov switching modelling 
framework is that Grexit is a process, not an event. Even if negotiations fail, even if Greece defaults, 
even if the Greek authorities start to issue new drachma – even then, an erratic macroeconomic 
environment matters in policy choices and outcomes. 
 
Figure 4: Depreciation of the New Drachma after a Grexit 
 
 
 
Figure 4 shows that after the Grexit, the new drachma exchange will take a nosedive. Our theory-
consistent baseline estimate in the left-hand panel of Figure 4 suggests a depreciation of the new 
drachma vis-à-vis the euro of around 50 per cent, but it could be much worse in the short term.22 
Comparing our results to those of the IMF (2012, Box 2, p. 46), it is comforting that the results for the 
drachma exchange rate are remarkably similar despite the differences in the models. What explains the 
new drachma halving in value? In other words, what does our intuition tell us about the above result? 
It is worth briefly summarizing the transmission channels and feedback loops from depreciation to 
                                                          
21 In Mohsen and Economidou (2005, Table 3) interest rate semi-elasticities for Greece are presented. The way 
to interpret the coefficients in the log-linear specification is as the percentage change in (𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) that we obtain 
from one unit change in 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡. This is in contrast to the log-log specification in equation (15), in which 𝛼𝛼1 gives the 
percentage change in (𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 − 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡) which we obtain from a percentage change in 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡. Therefore, one has to convert 
the semi-elasticity to full elasticity.  
22 During exchange rate turmoil, financial markets may revise the perceived probability of realignment upwards 
and may even anticipate an overshooting of the exchange rate after a collapse. 
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growth and inflation. On the one hand, Greece would enter another deep recession, which would push 
unemployment up further and reduce budget revenues, necessitating another round of harsh fiscal 
consolidation. On the other hand, due to structural factors, the responsiveness of the economy to price 
changes is rather low: Greece ranks below most other euro area countries in terms of the share of 
foreign trade to GDP and the elasticity of exports to international price competitiveness. 
Consequently, the depreciation of the new drachma may not revive the Greek economy to any great 
extent. In the right-hand panel of Figure 4, we illustrate graphically how sensitive the depreciation of 
the new drachma is to different levels of inflation and interest rates after the Grexit. To summarize, 
when Greece is heading for runaway inflation with 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 0.25 and 𝜋𝜋 = 0.23, the depreciation of the 
new drachma is even more pronounced.23 
 
4. Conclusion and Future Research 
 
Our admittedly simplistic model provides a novel analysis of the three-act Greek tragedy and sheds 
light on key mechanisms which could lead to a Grexit. The framework was deliberately kept simple 
and is about basic issues: public debt, sovereign default and euro area loans. More precisely, we 
discuss the developments in Greece since 2010 within a set up in which a Markov regime-switching 
process is embedded in a standard first-generation currency crisis framework. In other words, the 
modelling setup is a “hybrid” approach. It uses the Markov switching framework to model the merry-
go-round of Greek policymakers and combines it with the financial assistance programmes. We should 
add at this point that we would like to be cautious in claiming that our empirically-motivated Markov 
switching framework corresponds to causal effects of exogenous switches on endogenous economic 
outcomes. Nevertheless, we believe that our modelling approach is informative regarding the 
propagation of these shocks shaking the euro area. As far as we are aware, ours is the first approach to 
address this topical question.  
Although the canonical model presented above does not pretend to be comprehensive, it distils the 
most important impact channels and therefore has some important virtues. First of all, the currency 
crises clearly reflect a basic inconsistency between domestic fiscal policy and currency union; the 
specific, highly simplified form of that discrepancy in the set-up may be viewed as a metaphor for the 
more complex policy incoherence in Europe. Second, although the euro area leaders reached an 
agreement with Greece in August 2015, it remains uncertain whether the 3rd assistance package and 
the required market-oriented reforms will generate lasting growth. Of course there is the risk that the 
bailouts may buy time but also make it easier to waste it. This may store up bigger problems further 
                                                          
23 A similar robustness analysis can be conducted for other model parameters but leads to no substantial 
additional insights. 
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down the road. Ultimately, this depends upon whether the Greek authorities will have the strength and 
commitment needed to implement the necessary reform path over the coming years.24 
We recognize that the model presented, with stochastic changes in the policy stance, referred to as 
regime shifts, can be seen as an overly simplistic set-up. In particular, a downside of the reduced-form 
approach is that it assumes that switching is exogenous. The disadvantage of this approach is that 
policymakers are locked in to a given credibility level. Nevertheless, we hope that this paper will 
stimulate further research in models with more detailed behavioural structure. There are several 
dimensions we have not considered in our modelling framework. Going forward, one possible 
extension would be to add a political economy foundation, permitting discussion of the 
implementation of growth-enhancing structural reforms in politically fragile countries. This is clearly 
an area that deserves further study.   
                                                          
24 The potential gains of structural reforms depend critically on the interaction between several policy areas, such 
as competition in product markets, streamlined labour law, the efficiency of public administration and the ease of 
doing business, to name but a few. In other words, jointly implemented reforms tailored to national conditions 
are needed to obtain sizeable growth effects. 
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Appendix A: Regime Switching in Greece’s Budget Surplus/Deficit to GDP Ratio 
 
A two-regime Markov switching model, allowing for regime switching in coefficients and variances, 
is confronted with quarterly Greek data for the government budget surplus/deficit-to-GDP ratio 
𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡  from 2006. The model takes the following form: 
 (A1)                                                                −𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼0 + α1𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 +  𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 
 (A2)                                            𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡 = 𝜙𝜙1𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝜙2𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−2 +  ⋯  + 𝜙𝜙𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑡𝑡−𝑟𝑟 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
 (A3)                                                                𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡~𝑁𝑁(0,𝜎𝜎02 + 𝜎𝜎12𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡) 
 
where 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡  =  {0,1}, 𝛼𝛼0, and 𝜎𝜎02 are the mean and variance in state 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡  =  0 and the parameters 𝛼𝛼0 +
α1𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 and 𝜎𝜎02 + 𝜎𝜎12𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡 are the mean and variance in state 𝑑𝑑𝑡𝑡  =  1, respectively. The lags in equation 
(A2) are estimated ex post, i.e. 𝑟𝑟 has no effect on the Markov switching estimates.  
 
Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates and Standard Errors 
Parameter Estimate Standard error p-value 
𝛼𝛼0 -0.1030 0.0322 0.00 
𝛼𝛼1 0.0226 0.0063 0.00 
𝜎𝜎0
2 0.003344 0.0016 0.05 
𝜎𝜎1
2 0.000635 0.0002 0.01 
𝑝𝑝00 0.77 0.13 0.13 
𝑝𝑝11 0.91 0.26 0.00 
Notes: The model is estimated in absolute values, i.e. 0.01 = 1%. The expected duration of regime “0” (“1”) is 
4.29 (11.17) quarters. Data Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. 
 
Delving into the regression output reveals the presence of two regimes, one characterized by low and 
the other by high the government budget surplus/deficit. Smoothed probabilities are estimated using 
the entire sample. 
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
-0.2
-0.1
0
Ratio Primary Fiscal Surplus/Deficit to GDP
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
0
0.5
1
Smoothed Regime Probabilities
 
 
Regime 0
Regime 1
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
-0.1
-0.05
0
Conditional Mean
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
0.02
0.04
0.06
Conditional Standard Deviation
23 
 
Appendix B: Derivation of the Solutions for 𝒗𝒗𝟎𝟎 and 𝒗𝒗𝟏𝟏 
 
Subtracting equation (8) from (7) gives us: 
 (B1)                          �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑝𝑝10�(𝑣𝑣1 − 𝑣𝑣0) = 𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1 + 𝜕𝜕(𝑣𝑣1 − 𝑣𝑣0)𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 . 
 
It can clearly be seen that the solution to 𝑣𝑣1 − 𝑣𝑣0 is: 
 (B2)                     (𝑣𝑣1 − 𝑣𝑣0) = 𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1
𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10 �1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝+𝑝𝑝10�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�. 
 
Substituting (B2) into equation (7) and equation (8) in the main text yields: 
 (B3)   �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�𝑣𝑣0 = −𝛿𝛿0 + 𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10 �1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)� + 𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣0𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 , 
 (B4)   �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�𝑣𝑣1 = −𝛿𝛿1 − 𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10 �1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)� + 𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣1𝜕𝜕𝑡𝑡 . 
 
As equations (B3) and (B4) are no longer coupled, they can be solved separately. To keep the analysis 
simple, and without loss of generality, we can assume that 𝑣𝑣0 has the following solution: 
 (B5)                       𝑣𝑣0 = 𝛼𝛼 �1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)� + 𝛽𝛽 �1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�. 
 
Substituting equation (B5) back into equation (B3) and rearranging leaves us with: 
 (B6)     ��𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽) + 𝛿𝛿0 − 𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10�
− ��𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�𝛼𝛼 − �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�𝛼𝛼�𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)
− ��𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�𝛽𝛽 −
𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)
𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10
− �𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10�𝛽𝛽� 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡) = 0. 
 
Equation (B6) holds if all items in parentheses are equal to zero. The second set of parentheses related 
to 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡) is already equal to zero. From the first and third sets of parentheses, we have:  
 (B7)                              𝛽𝛽 =  − 𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) (𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10�. 
 
and the first set gives us: 
 (B8)           𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 = − 𝛿𝛿0
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�
+ 𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦��𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10�. 
 
Substituting equation (B7) into equation (B8) yields: 
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(B9)     𝛼𝛼 = − 𝛿𝛿0
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�
+ 𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10� � 1�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦� + 1 (𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)�= − 𝛿𝛿0
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�
+ 𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10). 
 
Therefore, we have the solution for 𝑣𝑣0 as follows: 
 (B10)       𝑣𝑣0 = �− 𝛿𝛿0
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�
+ 𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)��1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�   
−
𝑝𝑝01(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) (𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10� �1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�. 
 
The next step is to obtain the corresponding solution for 𝑣𝑣1. Following the same algebra steps as 
before, yields:  
 (B11)        𝑣𝑣1 = �− 𝛿𝛿1
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�
−
𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1)
�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)��1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�+ 𝑝𝑝10(𝛿𝛿0 − 𝛿𝛿1) (𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10)�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦 + 𝑝𝑝01 + 𝑝𝑝10� �1 − 𝑒𝑒−�𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10�(𝜏𝜏−𝑡𝑡)�. 
 
For the original guess to be correct, we need to cross-check whether prs (B10) and (B11) satisfy 
equation (B2). Substituting (B10) and (B11) back into equation (B2) shows that equation (B2) does 
indeed hold. Equations (B10) and (B11) resemble equations (9) and (10) in the main text. 
 
 
Appendix C: Derivation Equation (24) 
 
We normalize 𝑃𝑃∗ to be 1. Equations (19), (22) and (23) then give us 
  
(C1)                           𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 = 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠∗ + 𝛽𝛽1𝛽𝛽0+𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 �𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 �−𝛿𝛿1 − 𝑝𝑝10�𝛿𝛿0−𝛿𝛿1� 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10� + 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠� 
 
and 
 
(C2)                     𝛼𝛼1ln𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠 = 𝛼𝛼1 ln �𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠∗ + 𝛽𝛽1𝛽𝛽0+𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 �𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 �−𝛿𝛿1 − 𝑝𝑝10�𝛿𝛿0−𝛿𝛿1� 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10� + 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠�� 
 
We assume that the central bank counters the effects on the money supply via sterilisation. Notice that 
prior to the sudden stop, we have 
 
(C3)                                       𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝∗ − ln(1) = 𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝∗ = 𝛼𝛼0 − 𝛼𝛼1 ln 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠∗ 
 
From equation (C2) we know that after the attack the solution is 
 
(C4)             𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝∗ − 𝑑𝑑 = 𝛼𝛼0 − 𝛼𝛼1 ln �𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠∗ + 𝛽𝛽1𝛽𝛽0+𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 �𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 �−𝛿𝛿1 − 𝑝𝑝10�𝛿𝛿0−𝛿𝛿1� 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10� + 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠�� 
 
and thus 
 
(C5)                    𝑑𝑑 = 𝛼𝛼1 ln �𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠∗ + 𝛽𝛽1𝛽𝛽0+𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠 �𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 �−𝛿𝛿1 − 𝑝𝑝10�𝛿𝛿0−𝛿𝛿1� 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10� + 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠�� − ln 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠∗ 
 
25 
 
Therefore, we have the solution for the exchange rate as follows: 
 
(C6)                              ln 𝑙𝑙 = 𝛼𝛼1 ln�1 + 𝛽𝛽1𝛽𝛽0+𝛽𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠�𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠�−𝛿𝛿1− 𝑝𝑝10�𝛿𝛿0−𝛿𝛿1� 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠−𝜋𝜋−𝜂𝜂𝑦𝑦+𝑝𝑝01+𝑝𝑝10�+𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠𝐵𝐵𝑠𝑠� 𝑟𝑟𝑠𝑠∗ � 
 
This completes the proof. 
